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Finding the force: a novel word learning experiment with modals 
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Abstract. This study investigates the semantic and pragmatic challenges of acquiring 
the force of English modals, which express possibility (e.g., might) and necessity (e.g., 
must). Children seem to struggle with modal force through at least age 4, over-
accepting both possibility modals where adults would prefer necessity modals, and 
necessity modals in possibility situations. These difficulties are typically blamed on 
pragmatic or conceptual immaturity. In this study, we sidestep these immaturity issues 
by investigating the challenges of modal learning through a novel word learning 
experiment with adults, for different ‘flavors’ of modals: epistemic (knowledge-based) 
versus teleological (goal-based), and comparing novel modals with actual English 
modals. We find that, when learning possibility modals, adult learners behave as 
expected: they accept novel modals in necessity situations, both in epistemic and 
teleological contexts, but less often after they have learned a pragmatically more 
appropriate necessity modal. However, when learning necessity modals, participants 
manage to learn the right force (i.e., reject them in possibility situations) for epistemic 
scenarios only; with teleological scenarios, they accept them in possibility situations. 
We propose that an overlap in modal flavor explains their behavior, specifically, the 
competition with an ability interpretation in teleological but not epistemic scenarios, 
which could also contribute to children’s difficulty with necessity modals reported in 
the acquisition literature.   
Keywords. modal force; modal flavor; novel word learning experiment; scalar impli-
catures 
1. Introduction. English modals express either possibility (e.g., might in (1a)) or necessity (e.g., 
must in (1b)).1 When and how do children figure out the force of their modals, for instance, that 
might means ‘possible’, and must, ‘necessary’? The previous acquisition literature shows that chil-
dren struggle with modal force until at least age 4. They both over-accept possibility modals in 
contexts where adults prefer necessity modals, and they over-accept necessity modals in possibility 
situations. These difficulties are typically blamed on pragmatic or conceptual immaturity: Their 
over-acceptance of possibility modals is blamed on difficulty computing implicatures, and failure 
to realize that  necessity modal is often more appropriate in necessity situations (Noveck 2001; 
Ozturk and Papafragou 2015, a.o.). Their over-acceptance of necessity modals in possibility situ-
ations is blamed on difficulty reasoning about open possibilities (Ozturk and Papafragou 2015; see 
also Acredolo and Horobin 1987). In both cases, it is assumed that children know the force of the 
modals, but have difficulty using them. But, could children’s over-acceptance of both possibility 
and necessity modals instead reflect a lack of knowledge of their underlying force? In this study, 
we investigate the semantic and pragmatic challenges of modal force acquisition beyond issues of 
 
* We thank the members of UMD/NYU Modality group, S-Lab and Acquisition Lab, especially Alexander 
Williams, Jeff Lidz, as well as Floriane Dieuleveut for the materials. This research is supported by NSF grant #BCS-
1551628. Authors: Anouk Dieuleveut, University of Maryland (adieulev@umd.edu); Ailís Cournane, New York Uni-
versity (cournane@nyu.edu) & Valentine Hacquard, University of Maryland (hacquard@umd.edu).  
1 Further force distinctions can be made: in particular, necessity modals are often split into strong (must) vs. 
weak (should) necessity (von Fintel and Iatridou 2008). In this study, we focus on the main contrast between possibility 
and necessity. 
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conceptual and pragmatic immaturity, by testing how adults learn novel modals, and what situa-
tions might be particularly challenging. Imagine a child hearing a new modal, sig, in (2). How does 
she determine whether sig means possible or necessary?   
 
(1) a. The keys might be in the drawer. possibility 
 b. The keys must be in the drawer.  necessity  
 
(2) The keys sig be in the drawer.   ? 
 
This mapping may be especially challenging for necessity modals, as modals give rise to a 
classic “subset problem” (Xu and Tenenbaum 2007; Piantadosi et al. 2013; Rasin and Aravind 
2020, a.o.): necessity entails possibility.  Thus, situations of necessity are also situations of possi-
bility. If sig means possible, but children initially think it means necessary, they should have 
evidence that their hypothesis is wrong, as sig will be sometimes used in situations where a neces-
sity is logically false (any situations of mere possibility). However, if sig means necessary, but 
children think it means possible, they may have no counterevidence that their hypothesis is too 
weak, as sig p will only be used by speakers in situations where a possibility statement, might p, 
is also logically true.2 
The child also needs to figure out how modals are used in conversation, and when the use of 
one is more appropriate than the other. English has both possibility and necessity modals, which 
form Horn scales (Horn, 1972). As such, they can give rise to scalar implicatures (SI) (Grice 1975; 
Horn 1972): for instance, the use of (1a) can implicate that it is not necessarily the case that the 
keys are in the drawer (not (must p)). In the Gricean tradition, this implicature arises from the 
assumption that participants in a conversation are trying to be maximally informative: speakers 
should prefer to use must p if it is relevant. Listeners can thus infer that it is not the case that the 
speaker believes the more informative (logically stronger) sentence (1b): not (must p). To make 
scalar implicatures, children need to know that their language has dual pairs, i.e., that <might, 
must>, similarly to <some, all>, form a Horn scale (Horn 1972). However, this is not the case in 
all languages: ‘variable force’ modals (i.e., modals that are used both in possibility and in necessity 
situations) have been described for several languages, and analyzed as underlying possibility 
modals (e.g., Nez Perce o’qa, Deal 2011; Gitksan =ima, Matthewson 2013; Peterson 2010) as well 
as underlyingly necessity modals (e.g., in St’´at’imcets, Rullmann et al. 2008; in Washo, Bochnak 
2015) (see Yanovich 2013 for a summary). This means that learners cannot expect their language 
to have modal duals. And even in a language with duals like English, knowing the force of one 
modal does not guarantee that the next modal expresses a different force, given that several lex-
emes can express the same force (e.g., can, might, may). Thus, to be able to know that a possibility 
modal is inappropriate in a necessity situation, the child needs to be aware of the existence (and 
underlying force) of an alternative necessity modal. Now imagine a child who has acquired possi-
bility modals in her language, but has wrongly acquired possibility meanings for her necessity 
modals, because of the overlap in force (subset problem). This child should thus both accept ne-
cessity modals (which she believes express possibility) in possibility situations, and possibility 
modals in necessity situations (since she lacks a stronger dual). Such a mapping error with neces-
sity modals could explain children’s difficulties in previous studies.  
 
2 Unless children can use evidence from downward-entailing environments, which reverse patterns of entail-
ment, as suggested for other subset problems (Gualmini and Schwarz 2009). However, it is unlikely that children can 
use such a strategy in the case of modals, given their input (see Dieuleveut et al. 2019, in prep, for discussion).  
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We would like to highlight one last potentially complicating factor for force acquisition. In 
English, as in many other languages, the same modals can express different ‘flavors’, or types, of 
modality (Kratzer 1981, 1991): an epistemic (based on knowledge or evidence, as in (1a-b)), or 
various root modalities, like teleological (based on goals, and illustrated in (3a-b)), deontic (based 
on rules), bouletic (based on desires) or ability (based on capacities). The context typically helps 
determine what flavor is intended. But, from a learner’s perspective it is important to note that 
these flavors are not mutually exclusive (e.g., it could both be likely and required for my keys to 
be the drawer). The force challenge could in principle be easier to resolve in some flavors than 
others. But the overlap in flavor raises a potential further challenge for force acquisition: could a 
necessity modal intended in one flavor be interpreted as a possibility modal in another flavor?  
 
(3) a. To get to the library, we can go down the yellow road. POSSIBILITY 
 b. To get to the library, we must go down the yellow road. NECESSITY  
 
In this study, we investigate the semantic and pragmatic challenges of acquiring the force of 
modals, independent of conceptual or pragmatic immaturity, by using a novel word learning ex-
periment with adults. Given the subset problem, how good are learners at figuring out force? Do 
learners accept novel modals learned in possibility contexts in necessity situations? Do they accept 
novel modals learned in necessity contexts in possibility situations? What is the effect of knowing 
a scalemate? And finally, do we find differences between flavors, here epistemic vs. teleological?  
Our results show that when learning possibility modals, adult learners behave as expected: 
they accept novel modals in necessity situations, but less so after they have learned a pragmatically 
more appropriate necessity modal, both in epistemic and teleological contexts. However, when 
learning necessity modals, participants manage to learn the right force (rejecting them in possibil-
ity situations) only for epistemic scenarios. With teleological scenarios, they do not learn necessity 
modals, and accept them in possibility situations. We propose that their behavior in teleological 
scenarios can be explained by an overlap in flavor, specifically, the competition with an ability 
interpretation. We relate this finding to children’s reported difficulty with necessity modals in the 
acquisition literature, and argue that overlap in flavor (here, teleological and ability) might be more 
of a problem than overlap in force (possibility and necessity) for modal force acquisition.  
2. Study. In this study, we test how adults learn novel modals, by introducing them to a fictional 
dialect of English. They are taught modals either in possibility contexts (where it is clear that more 
than one option is open) or necessity contexts (where it is clear than there is just a single option), 
and then have to judge whether that modal is appropriate in necessity or possibility situations. We 
investigate how being taught a scale-mate in a second round of learning affects their judgments 
(e.g., they should be more reluctant to accept a possibility modal in a necessity situation if they’ve 
previously learned a necessity modal), and whether their judgements vary as a matter of flavor (we 
tested both teleological and epistemic scenarios, between subjects).  
2.1. PROCEDURE. Participants were introduced to Luke, who is learning new words from a (fic-
tional) foreign dialect, Kabberton English, from a native-speaker, Mary.3 All participants learned 
3 novel words in blocks. Word 1 was a control (frimp ~ ‘to grab’). Words 2 & 3 varied between 
 
3
 Examples of the experiments (for epistemic and teleological conditions) can be accessed below: 
Kabberton experiment epistemic: http://spellout.net/ibexexps/AD/kab_sg_eNeP_G_2/experiment.html 
teleological: http://spellout.net/ibexexps/AD/kab_sg2_tPtN_S_1/experiment.html  
English experiment epistemic: http://spellout.net/ibexexps/AD/kab_mod_eNeP_S_1/experiment.html 
teleological: http://spellout.net/ibexexps/AD/kab_mod2_tNtP_S_2/experiment.html 
Proceedings of ELM 1: 136-146, 2021
Anouk Dieuleveut, Ailı́s Cournane and Valentine Hacquard:
Finding the force: a novel word learning experiment with modals. 138
 
 
subjects, either a novel possibility modal first (learned in POSSIBILITY situations, tested in 
NECESSITY situations), or a novel necessity modal first (learned in NECESSITY, tested in 
POSSIBILITY), followed by a block with the other modal. For all words, participants first saw Mary 
use the word (Training 1: 4 items), then Luke (Training 2: 4 yes-control, 4 no-control, with feed-
back), then the test phase (Test: 6 trials, 6 yes-control, 6 no-control, no feedback). Participants had 
to judge whether Luke’s use of the word was correct, by choosing between ‘Yes, that’s correct’ 
and ‘No, that’s not correct.’ Figure 1 illustrates POSSIBILITY, NECESSITY and IMPOSSIBILITY situa-
tions by flavor, with test sentences (4).4 Figure 2 summarizes the procedure. We ran an identical 
experiment with English modals as a control, testing might/must (epistemic flavor) and can/must 
(teleological flavor). The only difference was in the instructions: in the English version, Luke was 
from Kabberton, and was learning English with Mary. Experiments were run on Alex Drummond’s 
IBEX Farm. At the end of the Novel Word experiment, participants were asked to provide trans-
lations. We tested Flavor (teleological vs. epistemic) between subjects and Force (possibility vs. 
necessity) within. Participants saw either a necessity modal first or a possibility modal. Conditions 
are summarized in (5). Details of the instructions are given in the Appendix. 
 
(4) epistemic:   Kabberton: ‘The keys sig/gleeb be in the [blue] box.’ 
English (Control): ‘The keys might/must be in the [blue] box.’ 
teleological:  Kabberton: ‘We sig/gleeb go down the [blue] road.’  
English (Control): ‘We can/must go down the [blue] road.’ 
 
(5) Experiment: Kabberton (Novel Word) vs. English (Control) (between subjects) 
 Flavor:  epistemic vs. teleological   (between subjects) 
 Force:  possibility modal vs. necessity modal   (within subjects) 
 Order:  learnt first vs. second (i.e., knowing a dual) (between subjects) 
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Figure 2. Experimental procedure: Novel Word (Kabberton) experiment in the epistemic condi-
tion, with block order: control, possibility, necessity.  
2.2. EXPECTATIONS. English experiment. Participants should reject possibility modals (might/can) 
in NECESSITY situations if they assume an SI, and accept them if they do not (literal interpretation). 
They should reject necessity modals (must) in POSSIBILITY situations. Kabberton experiment. 
When learning a novel modal in POSSIBILITY contexts, participants should accept it in NECESSITY 
situations, unless they previously learned a stronger dual. When learning a novel modal in 
NECESSITY contexts, participants should reject it in POSSIBILITY situations, if they learned it as a 
necessity modal, but accept it if they learned it as a possibility modal.  
2.3. PARTICIPANTS. 386 U.S. English participants were recruited on Amazon MT (Kabberton ex-
periment, n=194 (97 female, age m=37yrs); English experiment: n=192 (97 female, age 
m=38yrs); after exclusion on controls (3.4%): 373 participants (Kabberton: 188, English: 185).  
2.4. RESULTS. Data analyses were conducted using R (R Core Team, 2013), using the package 
lme4 (Bates et al., 2014a, 2014b). We used binomial linear mixed effects models, built with a 
maximal random effect structure based on subjects and items as random variables, even though 
we sometimes had to step back to random intercepts only models when the model failed to con-
verge with the full random effects specification (following Barr et al.).5 Figure 3 shows proportion 
of yes responses on test trials for both Kabberton and English experiments, depending on block 
order and flavor, for possibility and necessity modals. Test trials for possibility modals correspond 
to NECESSITY situations (red bars), and to POSSIBILITY situations (yellow bars) for necessity 
modals. Table 1 reports the mean proportion of yes answers (with standard error) on POSSIBILITY 
and NECESSITY situations, depending on order and flavor. Analysis. The error rate on controls was 
very low (Kabberton: 3.3%; English: 2.8 %). In the English version of the experiment, we find a 
relatively low rate of Scalar Implicatures, especially in the teleological condition (yes answers in 
NECESSITY: epistemic might: 90.4%; teleological can: 97.9%). Participants correctly reject 
 
5 These cases are indicated with FTC (for “Failure to Converge”) in Tables 2 and 3. 
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necessity modals in POSSIBILITY situations, for both flavors (epistemic must: 13.0%; teleological 
must: 19.9%). In the Novel Word experiment, we find that participants accept novel possibility 
modals in NECESSITY contexts at high rates for both epistemic (81.5%) and teleological (98.6%) 
modals, with no difference with the English controls might/can (Table 2). However, when they 
learn necessity modals, we find an unexpected difference between flavors. Participants correctly 
learn a necessity modal in the epistemic condition (they accept it in POSSIBILITY at only 23.6%, 
with no significant difference with English might). But they do not seem to learn the necessity 
modal as necessity in the teleological condition, and accept it 77.2% in POSSIBILITY situations, with 
a significant difference with the English control (Kabberton vs. English: χ2(1)= 77.9, p 
<.0001***), suggesting they have learned a possibility modal (Table 2). Effect of Order. For pos-
sibility modals, we find a significant effect of order in both experiments: they are accepted less 
often when learned second, i.e., when subjects know a scale-mate (Novel Word: epistemic: 46.4%; 
teleological: 64.3%; English: might: 47.1%; can: 87.2%) (Table 3). However, for necessity modals 
we again find a difference between epistemic and teleological flavors: there is no significant effect 
for epistemics, and for teleologicals, the effect goes in the opposite direction for the Kabberton 
and the English experiments (decrease for Kabberton, increase for English), with a highly signifi-
cant interaction effect.  
 
 
Figure 3. Proportion of yes responses for possibility and necessity modals in NECESSITY (red) and 
POSSIBILITY (yellow) situations, faceted for force (possibility, necessity), order (1st, 2nd) and fla-
vor (Epistemic, Teleological) (Epistemic: Kabberton: n=91 participants *6 observations, English: 
n=91*6; Teleological: Kabberton: n=97*6, English: n=96*6). 
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Table 1. Proportion of yes answers (standard error in parentheses) on POSSIBILITY (P) and 
NECESSITY (N) situations for possibility and necessity modals, depending on order and flavor, for 
the Kabberton (n=188 participants*6 observations) and the English experiments (n=185 partici-
pants*6 observations). Bold cells correspond to test cases. Accuracy on no-controls 
(IMPOSSIBILITY) was very high, with no difference between groups, so we don’t report here. 
  
 Word Learnt 1st  Word Learnt 2nd  
Epistemic possibility  
FTC with full specification 
χ 2 (1) = 0.20, p = 0.65 
χ 2 (1) = 2.2, p = 0.14 
Epistemic necessity  χ 2 (1) = 3.23, p = 0.072 χ 2 (1) = 0.91, p = 0.34 
Teleological possibility  
FTC with full specification 
χ 2 (1) = 0.46, p = 0.50 
χ 2 (1) = 0.55, p = 0.46 
Teleological necessity  χ 2 (1) = 77.9, p <2e-16*** χ 2 (1) = 25.9, p = 4e-07*** 
  
Table 2. Comparison between Kabberton and English experiment test conditions, for epistemic 
and teleological possibility and necessity modals. 
 Kabberton Experiment  English Experiment  
Epistemic possibility  
(tested in NECESSITY) 
FTC with full specification 
χ 2 (1) = 21.4, p = 3.7e-06 *** 
χ 2 (1) = 8.1, p = 0.004 ** 
Epistemic necessity  
(tested in POSSIBILITY) 
χ 2 (1) = 1.37, p = 0.24 (NS) χ 2 (1) = 0.13, p = 0.71 (NS) 
Teleological possibility  
(tested in NECESSITY) 
FTC with full specification 
χ 2 (1) = 10, p = 0.0015 ** 
χ 2 (1) = 23.5, p = 1.24e-06 *** 
Teleological necessity  
(tested in POSSIBILITY) 
χ 2 (1) = 36, p = 2e-09 *** χ 2 (1) = 38.9, p = 4.34e-10 *** 
  
Table 3. Results of models testing effect of knowing a dual for possibility and necessity epis-
temic and teleological modals on test conditions for the Kabberton and English experiments. 
  Kabberton (sig/gleeb) 
(n=188 * 6) 
English ({can/might}/must) 
(n=185 * 6) 
  Word Learnt 1st Word Learnt 2nd Word Learnt 1st Word Learnt 2nd 
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2.5. TRANSLATIONS. At the end of the Novel Word experiment, participants were asked to provide 
translations. Table 4 summarizes their answers, by flavor and force. Grey cells correspond to ac-
curate translations. We see that possibility modals are overall correctly identified more often than 
necessity modals. Necessity teleological modals are quite often translated with possibility modals 
(21%), but epistemic modals are not (8%). Epistemic necessity modals are quite often translated 








Table 4. Translations for sig/gleeb (Kabberton Experiment). Considered as possibility modals: 
can, could, may, might, allow, be able; as necessity modals: must, have to, should; other: no an-
swer, I don’t remember; nonsense words. 
3. Discussion. We find that adult learners accept novel possibility modals in new necessity situa-
tions at high rates, for both epistemic and teleological flavors. This suggests that they correctly 
learn them as possibility modals: they behave as Nez-Perce speakers, who lack a stronger scale-
mate in their language that would be more appropriate (Deal 2011; see also Ozturk & Papafragou, 
2015). We find a significant effect of having learned a scale-mate, again for both epistemic and 
teleological flavors: novel possibility modals are accepted less often once learners know that there 
is another word in the lexicon to describe NECESSITY situations. Learners thus make scalar impli-
catures with novel words.  
Turning to novel necessity modals, we find an (unexpected) difference between epistemic and 
teleological scenarios. In the epistemic condition, learners correctly learn novel necessity modals: 
they accept them in possibility situations at only 23.6%, with no significant difference with English 
must (13.0%). But in the teleological condition, the rate of rejection is much lower: most partici-
pants accept them in possibility situations (77%), with a highly significant difference with English 
can (19.9%), suggesting that they have learnt a possibility modal despite being exposed to the 
novel modal only in NECESSITY situations in the learning phase. Why do participants accept novel 
necessity modals in teleological possibility situations? And how can we explain the difference 
between epistemic and teleological conditions?  
Participants’ behavior in the teleological condition might come from differences in perspec-
tives between the learner and the experimenter: participants might not interpret our (intended) 
teleological necessity situations as such. These scenarios make an ability interpretation salient: the 
question of whether it is ‘possible or not’ to go down the yellow road might be more salient than 
whether it is ‘possible or necessary’ to use this road to get to their goal. A competition with an 
ability interpretation would also explain the ceiling acceptance rate found for English can in those 
scenarios (98.6% when learned 1st), and the fact that participants do not make scalar implicatures: 
they do not seem to consider ‘we must go down the yellow road’ as a more relevant sentence to 
use. Potentially reinforcing this, regardless of whether they were learning a possibility or a neces-
sity modal, participants were trained on IMPOSSIBILITY situations: this might have indirectly 
manipulated the QUD, and increased the contrast possible/impossible.  
This result opens up a new possibility for what might make modal force acquisition challeng-
ing for children. If children tend to interpret situations where parents intend a teleological necessity 
as ability, they could lexicalize a possibility meaning for necessity modals. This could explain their 
  P modal N modal be will verb other 
ep
i P 78% 4% 4% 0% 0% 14% 
N 8% 48% 29% 3% 0% 11% 
te
l P 63% 8% 0% 2% 11% 18% 
N 21% 53% 0% 3% 11% 14% 
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difficulties reported in the acquisition literature: both results from comprehension experiments, 
where children are found to over-accept necessity modals in – intended – possibility situations 
(e.g., Noveck 2001; Ozturk and Papafragou 2015), and results from corpus studies with younger 
children, which show that 2-year-olds use necessity modals in situations where adults expect pos-
sibility modals (Dieuleveut et al. 2019). In epistemic scenarios, the same problem may not arise 
(at least in our scenarios), as competition with an ability interpretation is less likely.6 
4. Conclusion. In this study we have addressed semantic and pragmatic factors that may affect 
modal force learning, using a Novel Word paradigm with adult English speakers. Through study-
ing adult learners, we aim to better understand why child learners struggle with modal force. Does 
their non-adult-like behavior come from conceptual issues, from semantic issues (not having lex-
icalized the right force, either assuming necessity meanings for might, or possibility meaning for 
must), or does it come from pragmatics (not making scalar implicatures, i.e. not considering ne-
cessity alternatives as relevant when adults would)? Our study with adults, who have mature 
conceptual and pragmatic abilities, suggest that children’s struggles could also be due to problems 
interpreting flavor correctly, rather than an issue with force per se, nor with implicatures. Our 
results thus highlight the importance of taking into account flavor variability to understand the 
source of children’s struggles with force reported in the acquisition literature. 
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